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Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting - Productivity, Preferences and Gender
Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004024
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An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis
Hörisch, Hannah; Strassmair, Christina - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across …Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test … the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785872
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Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment
Hörisch, Hannah - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785895
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An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis
Hörisch, Hannah; Strassmair, Christina - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across …Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test … the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187333
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Credit risk management in banks: Hard information, soft Information and manipulation
Godbillon-Camus, Brigitte; Godlewski, Christophe - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
The role of information’s processing in bank intermediation is a crucial input. The bank has access to different types of information in order to manage risk through capital allocation for Value at Risk coverage. Hard information, contained in balance sheet data and produced with credit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836711
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Observability of information gathering in agency models
Hoppe, Eva I. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We consider an adverse selection model in which the agent can gather private information before the principal offers the contract. There are two scenarios. In scenario I, information gathering is a hidden action, while in scenario II, the principal observes the agent's information gathering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110196
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Reliance Investments, Expectation Damages and Hidden Information
Schweizer, Urs - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
A setting of reliance investments is explored where one of the parties to a contract obtains private information concerning his utility or cost function that remains hidden to the other party and to courts. As a consequence, it will be a difficult task to award expectation damages corrrectly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785914
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On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
A seller and a buyer can write a contract. After that, the seller produces a good. She can influence the expected quality of the good by making unobservable investments. Only the seller learns the realized quality. Finally, trade can occur. It is always ex post efficient to trade. Yet, it may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568373
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On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2002
A buyer and a seller can exchange one unit of an indivisible good. While producing the good, the seller can exert unobservable effort (hidden action). Then the buyer realizes whether his valuation is high or low, which stochastically depends upon the seller's effort level (hidden information)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622105
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Performance measure congruity in linear agency models with interactive tasks
Budde, Jörg - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
This note demonstrates how performance measure congruity and noise determine an agency’s total surplus within an linear agency framework with multiple tasks. It provides a decomposition of agency costs, leading back to a congruity index previously proposed in the literature. In addition,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835207