lobbying. In a non-cooperative equilibrium, each country chooses the level of R&D subsidy independently and fails to … internalizes technology spillover but is vulnerable to lobbying by politicians from each country, who attempt to free-ride on the …. Furthermore, this threshold is an increasing function in the effectiveness of lobbying. This paper also considers the possibility …

agricultural protection in the US: (i) legislator preferences, (ii) electoral incentives, or (iii) lobbying. Using data on the roll … agricultural protection, but that legislator preferences and lobbying play a role, too. Moreover, legislator preferences and …

This paper examines lobbying and corruption as alternative ways of dealing with regulatory obstacles. I propose a model … of a firm bribing legislators and other rule makers, suggesting that lobbying introduces the possibility of state capture …

In this paper we present a model of the behavior of commercial lobbying firms (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists … of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups, commercial lobbying firms represent a variety of … their behalf to policymakers. In our analysis we address two basic questions; why do commercial lobbying firms exist, and …

largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of electoral incentives. …

We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying … optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with …