Showing 1 - 10 of 1,277
This paper examines lobbying and corruption as alternative ways of dealing with regulatory obstacles. I propose a model … that firms who join lobby groups do not stop paying bribes to bureaucrats, and firms more impacted by corruption are no … of a firm bribing legislators and other rule makers, suggesting that lobbying introduces the possibility of state capture …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114331
bureaucracy with discretionary power creates and extracts rents by manipulating with the public good supply and regulations: i) by … agents to comply with. The former type of corruption results in less public input being provided at higher cost to the … is higher in the environment with corrupt bureaucracy. We show this outcome using a simple theoretical model, and then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621274
This paper analyzes how corruption affects the composition of public expenditures. First, a two-stage rent …-seeking model with endogenous rent-setting is derived that captures both "political corruption" and "bureaucratic corruption". The … levels of corruption. The significance of these distortions is robust to a variety of specifications such as fixed effects …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684881
The paper is an attempt to observe the effects of the development of rent-seeking or lobbying groups on the growth pace … policies implemented both at micro and macro level after the 1980s revealed the importance of lobbying effect on policies … examples of the literature on lobbying and its effects on growth. Taking from Mancur Olson’s inspiring book, The Rise and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008873557
suggests thaht corruption, which is likely to emerge in long term reciprocal relationships between public officials and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259731
suggests that corruption, which is likely to emerge in long term reciprocal relationships between public officials and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027124
An incentive-compatibility framework for regulating a monopolist with unknown costs is applied to the sponsor’s problem of monitoring a bureau. Following Mueller (1989), the bureau does not make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals to the sponsor. Rather, the bureau must announce a marginal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621692
This is a note on corruption and underground economy in a Kaldor-type model of the business cycle. It appears that when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114210
Any legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552800
between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field …We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more … pure anticipation of future rewards from a lobbying party suffices to bias a decision-maker in favor of this party, even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540487