potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation …

laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second …-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the chopstick …

, despite the absence of free-riding incentives. In a laboratory experiment, subjects indeed under-contribute relative to …

In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching problems where agents in one side of the market (schools … imposed, a stable matching may not exist. We develop a strategyproof mechanism called Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism …

In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching problems where agents in one side of the market (hospitals … & Shapley (GS) mechanism is strategyproof, (iii) the obtained matching is stable, and (iv) the obtained matching is optimal for … cover most of existing works on strategyproof mechanisms that can handle distributional constraints in many-to-one matching …

we propose a fairness property called P-monotonicity that we would like a matching mechanism to satisfy. We show that …

first stage but not in the second stage. Our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject’s utility …

results of an experiment administered in the United States reported by Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992). The results for both … experiments, increasing the probability of audit always increases compliance; higher penalty rates are ineffective to increase …