In this paper, we use experimental data to study players' stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report beliefs and to choose actions. Subjects saw each of 12 games four times in a regular or isomorphic form spread over two days without feedback. We document a high degree of...

We use two theoretical categories of the work of Robert Nozick (1974), (a) protection agencies and (b) minimal state, to illustrate by analogy to the CMSP, the dilemmas arising from the use of private military in regions with civil wars and conflicts irregular. We see that the relations...

This paper investigates the conventional wisdom that markets would naturally allocate the rights for performing decisional task to those players who might be best suited to perform the task. We embedded the decisional tasks in a stylised setting of a game, motivated by Littlewood(1953) Red Hat...

In this paper I examine the paradoxical role of language in conflict situations. Support the war and negotiation belong to a game of "speech acts" structured by a double metonymic and metaphorical relationship. That metaphorical relationship between both conceptualizes negotiation as a condensed...

This paper implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher...

This paper concerns assimilation between physiques and economics. Assuming fixed time value of goods each year along with a new concept of empty goods and its interpretation on good’s exchange. We redefined the economy and briefly described the macroeconomic, the microeconomic and Islamic...

This paper exposes a formal model of the spiral of silence theory. It is based on game theoy. The game consists on three players: players 1 and two have two strategies, to speak (s) or not (~s); the third player is Nature, which decides whether players 1 and 2 agree in their opinion or not. If...

I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can lead to under-contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who...

Scholars and policymakers have devoted much attention to issues of third party intervention in conflict. The present paper considers a conflict that draws two countervailing outside interveners. As in the realist perspective, the outside parties are drawn to intervene through some economic or...