Governments sometimes promote rules backed by sanctions too weak to make obedience privately optimal. Factors that may help make such rules effective include the presence of informal sanctions by peers, and implementation through voting. I study the impact of non-deterrent formal sanctions on...

This paper develops a model of small open economy, with a differentiated goods sector and voluntary provisioning of public good. It is shown that trade policy can alter the quantity of public good provided in the equilibrium. Interestingly, tariffs may fail to protect, leading to a Metzler...

Security of supply in electricity is questioned in liberalised markets as it is often characterised as a public good. We examine if this can be modified allowing for creation of security markets, which can be justified by welfare gains. From a welfare perspective it is possible that security...

Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant game-theoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors...

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights promises free elementary education and free choice of schools to children and their parents. International fora emphasise the first right while neglecting the second. This essay examines arguments for limiting school choice and finds each of them to be...

I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can lead to under-contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who...

This paper investigates the informational requirements of resource allocation processes in public goods economies with any number of firms and commodities. We show that the Lindahl mechanism is informationally effcient in the sense that it uses the smallest message space among smooth resource...

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An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type...