More aggressive acquiring firms paid higher executive compensation than non or less aggressive acquiring firms. This paper applies the generalized propensity score (GPS) methodology to estimate the relationship between a firm’s acquisition and its executive compensation. Allowing for...

We analyze the effects of CEOs' layoff risk on their risk choice while overseeing a firm. A CEO, whose managerial ability is unknown, is fired if her expected ability is below average. Her risk choice changes the informativeness of output and market's belief about her ability. She can decrease...

In a simple firm value model we consider the impact of the insolvency probability on the valuation of equity and debt, which are assumed to be not publicly traded. For the case of a distressed company, which usually has high debt and low equity, we can show that the impact becomes increasingly...

This research considers the strategies on the initial public offering of company equity at the stock exchanges in the imperfect highly volatile global capital markets with the nonlinearities. We provide the IPO definition and compare the initial listing requirements on the various markets. We...

This paper shows that it is profitable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain investment strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on...

Using nationally representative survey data for Finnish employees linked to register data on their wages and work histories we find wage effects of high involvement management (HIM) practices are generally positive and significant. However, employees with better wage and work histories are more...

We study optimal incentives in a principal-agent problem in which the agent's outside option is determined endogenously in a competitive labor market. In equilibrium, strong performance increases the agent's market value. When this value becomes sufficiently high, the threat of the agent's...

We analyze the optimal design of rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous workers. Iftournament prizes do not differ between the workers(uniform prizes), as in the previous tournament literature, the outcome will be ineffcient. In the case of limited liability, the employer may benefit from...

This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases...

This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that: (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has...