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directors and executive managers which may bring serious agency problem in the acquisition decision. The self-selection effect … compensation is more prominent for executive managers than board directors. As the executive managers as a whole, can benefit more … executive management positions as well as higher growth of executive compensation from aggressive acquisition than board …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114244
We analyze the effects of CEOs' layoff risk on their risk choice while overseeing a firm. A CEO, whose managerial … ability is unknown, is fired if her expected ability is below average. Her risk choice changes the informativeness of output … and market's belief about her ability. She can decrease her layoff risk by taking excessive risk and trade off current …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418517
-determinant for the successful IPO deal completion. We propose the Ledenyov theory on the origins of the IPO underpricing and long …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258000
In a simple firm value model we consider the impact of the insolvency probability on the valuation of equity and debt, which are assumed to be not publicly traded. For the case of a distressed company, which usually has high debt and low equity, we can show that the impact becomes increasingly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837082
researchers pay a particular attention to banking governance. Specifically, shareholders-managers’ convergence of interests and … negative effect on performance. The results also reveal that managers lack control while the board of directors seems to exert …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694021
This study investigates the validity of Capital Asset Pricing (CAP) Model in Karachi stock exchange (KSE). The data of 387 companies of 30 different sectors on monthly, quarterly and semiannual basis are used. The Paired sample t- test is applied to find the difference between actual and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009220664
We study optimal incentives in a principal-agent problem in which the agent's outside option is determined endogenously in a competitive labor market. In equilibrium, strong performance increases the agent's market value. When this value becomes sufficiently high, the threat of the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108859
fundamental dilemma in tournament theory. Individual prizes exhibit two major advantages - they allow the extraction of worker …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785819
strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers … may serve as a substitute for delegation via contracts. By delegating to overoptimistic managers, firms can escape the rat …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008581229
histories we find wage effects of high involvement management (HIM) practices are generally positive and significant. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008835360