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Collusion in board of directors
Bourjade, Sylvain; Germain, Laurent - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
The aim of this paper is to study what is the best structure of a Board of Directors when collusive aspects between the Board and the CEO are taken into account. We analyze how shareholders should select the members of the Board in a framework with asymmetric information and uncertainty about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368168
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On the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward leveraged buyout transactions implementation during private equity investment in conditions of resonant absorptio...
Ledenyov, Dimitri O.; Ledenyov, Viktor O. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011156987
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Strategies on initial public offering of company equity at stock exchanges in imperfect highly volatile global capital markets with induced nonlinearities
Ledenyov, Dimitri O.; Ledenyov, Viktor O. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
This research considers the strategies on the initial public offering of company equity at the stock exchanges in the imperfect highly volatile global capital markets with the nonlinearities. We provide the IPO definition and compare the initial listing requirements on the various markets. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258000
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Analyse de l'impact des coûts de participation sur la stratégie des enchérisseurs dans les Prises de contrôle
Burkart, Mike - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
We consider a takeover in which risk neutral bidders must incur participation costs and study their optimal strategy … that a potential bidder will stay out of takeover process. Moreover, when he decides to participate in takeover, his … the target firm, overbids when he participates in takeover. This can led to an inefficient allocation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004201
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Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives
Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699423
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On the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward leveraged buyout transactions implementation during private equity investment in conditions of resonant absorptio...
Ledenyov, Dimitri O.; Ledenyov, Viktor O. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107335
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On the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward leveraged buyout transactions implementation during private equity investment in conditions of resonant absorptio...
Ledenyov, Dimitri O.; Ledenyov, Viktor O. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111186
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Mechanism Design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision
Papakonstantinou, A.; Rogers, A.; Gerding, E. H; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly probabilistic estimate of some unknown parameter, by eliciting and fusing estimates from multiple suppliers. Each of these suppliers is capable of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258050
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Multi-dimensional auctions under information asymmetry for costs and qualities
Papakonstantinou, A.; Bogetoft, P. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
This paper discusses the design of a novel multi-dimensional mechanism which allows a principal to procure a single project or an item from multiple suppliers through a two-step payment. The suppliers are capable of producing different qualities at costs which cannot exceed a certain value and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259763
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Mechanism Design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in Distributed Information Systems
Papakonstantinou, A.; Rogers, A; Gerding, E. H.; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly forecast of a future event (such as a meteorological phenomenon) or a probabilistic estimate of a specific parameter (such as the quality of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109324