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A model of delegated project choice
Armstrong, Mark; Vickers, John - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835706
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A Mountain Biker cannot start a journey in sixth gear: An Assessment of the U.N. Global Compact’s Use of Soft Law as a Global Governance Structure for Corporate Social Responsibili...
Ghafele, Roya; Mercer, Angus - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
The practical impossibility of employing hard law at an international level has meant that softer codes of conduct have stepped in to fill the void. The Global Compact is the most ambitious of these codes, created with a desire to engage business in the project of international development and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260197
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Delegation to potentially uninformed agent
Semenov, Aggey - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
We consider a delegation problem with a potentially uninformed agent when the principal cannot use monetary payments …. If the bias between the principal and the agent is large, then the optimal delegation set is an interval. When the bias … is small or medium however, the optimal delegation set is no longer connected. It can be one of two types: with an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107725
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Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
Liang, Pinghan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal-intermediary-agent hierarchy. In … this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We … characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111077
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Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Choice of Competition Mode under a Vertical Structure
Choi, Kangsik; Lim, Seonyoung - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
, Bertrand competition can be sustained with this delegation of competition mode choice. Thus, a conflict of interest between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114015
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Competing risks analysis and deposit insurance governance convergence
Christopher, Gandrud - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
Why do policies often seem to converge across countries at the same time? This question has been studied extensively in the diffusion literature. However, past research has not examined complex choice environments, especially where there are many alternatives. My paper aims to fill this gap in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422000
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Delegation and Rewards
Vetter, Stefan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556731
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Delegation and Rewards
Vetter, Stefan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540487
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Allocation of Authority when a Person is not a Robot
Li, Jianpei; Wu, Yanhui - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
, and the relationship between the resources. Monitoring is then introduced to fine tune value of delegation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785789
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On Delegation under Relational Contracts
Gürtler, Oliver - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
In this paper, a principal’s decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785829