Discussion of "Lumpy Price Adjustments: A Microeconometric Analysis" by Emmanuel Dhyne, Catherine Fuss, Hashem Pesaran, and Patrick Sevestre (2007); Presented at the Spring 2007 Conference of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Banque De France on "Micro-Data and Macroeconomic Implications," April...

This is a discussion of Ratfai (2007), presented at the 2007 Macroeconomics Workshop of the Rimini Center for Economic Analysis on "The Macroeconomics of Price Setting," May 10-11, 2007, University of Bologna, Rimini, Italy.

This paper makes a pioneering attempt to provide a theory of determination of interest rate in the informal credit market in a less developed economy in terms of a three-sector static deterministic general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain production loans from a...

Discussion of "The Pricing Behavior of Firms in the Euro Area: New Survey Evidence" by S. Fabiani, M. Druant, I. Hernando, C. Kwapil, B. Landau, C. Loupias, F. Martins, T. Mathä, R. Sabbatini, H. Stahl, and A. Stockman (2004); Presented at the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN) Conference on...

Existence of monopoly and its costs to societies have been intensely studied. However, there has been no clear view obtained yet. Studies of rentseeking approach of the public choice school even make the issue more interesting. This paper surveys from traditional Harberger’s triangle approach...

In nonlinear pricing environment with correlated types, we characterize optimal selling mechanisms when buyers could form a coalition to coordinate their reports and to arbitrage on the goods. We find that when the types of agents are weakly positively correlated, the optimal weakly...

This paper considers the screening problem faced by a monopolist of a network good in a general setting. We demonstrate that the joint presence of asymmetric information and network externalities revise the "no distortion on the top" and "one-way distortion" principle. The pattern of consumption...

This paper provides a new explanation for the dominance of the low-powered incentive contract over the high-powered incentive contract using a mixed model of moral hazard and adverse selection. We first show that the power of incentives in the second-best contract is lower than that in the...

This paper considers an entry-deterring nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incumbent firm of a network good. The analysis recognizes that the installed user base/network of incumbent monopolist has preemptive power in deterring entry if the entrant’s good is incompatible with the...

This paper studies the cost requirement for two-agent collusion-proof mechanism design. Unlike the existing results for general environments with three or more agents, it is shown that collusive behavior cannot be prevented freely in two-agent nonlinear pricing environments with correlated...