Crisis prevention is never an easy task and past experiences tell us that great turbulences may come in many different forms. As for the present global crisis, its inception was a mixture of errors of economic policy, of greed on the part many creditors and borrowers across the world and of...

Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Aufarbeitung der Hintergründe der Subprime-Krise sowie der nachfolgenden internationalen Banken- und Finanzkrisen. Auf dieser Basis werden Vor-schläge diskutiert, wie die erkannten Schwachstellen im Finanzsystem repariert bzw. behoben werden...

This paper illustrates how trust in management can be consolidated through the order and mode of application of enforcement measures (negotiating and punitive enforcement measures) which are employed in facilitating and maximising compliance with rules. “Whilst negotiating strategies are...

Policy implications of complexity economics (CE) are investigated. CE deals with “Complex Adaptive (Economic) Systems” [CA(E)S], generally characterized by mechanisms and properties such as “emergence” of structure or some capacity of “self-organization”. With this, CE has manifold...

In an industry where regulated firms interact with unregulated suppliers, we investigate the welfare effects of a merger between regulated firms when cost synergies are uncertain before the merger and their realization becomes private information of the merged firm. The optimal merger policy...

Entry of new firms can be difficult or even impossible at capacity constrained facilities, despite the actual cost of entering is low. Using a game theoretic model of incumbent firms’ pricing behaviour under these conditions, it is found that under the assumption of Bertrand competition and...

We investigate whether laws restricting fiscal policies across U.S. states lead politicians to adopt more partisan regulatory policy instead. We first show that partisan policy outcomes do exist across U.S. states, with Republicans cutting taxes and spending and Democrats raising them. We then...