examples are devel- oped. Moreover, in the case of normal-form games, the relation between reactivity and dominance is …

theory must obey. Our criterion, Competitiveness, is a weaker version of a dominance principle. Despite its modesty …

direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is … number of the game. The same is true if we replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained by … deleting from the agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal for all players in a winning coalition. Unlike the core, the …

Twelve sets, proposed as social choice solution concepts, are compared: the core, five versions of the uncovered set …

neither arbitrarily small coalitions nor large coalitions are enough to block an allocation which is not in the core, due to … the core provided by Vind and Schmeidler (1972) to economies with asymmetrically informed traders. We then focus on … finest information. Finally, characterizations for the weak fine, the fine and the private core are obtained as particular …

question of core stability of the grand coalition, namely: is there a subset of bidders that prefers forming a small bidding … the grand coalition is not necessarily core stable, as opposed to the zero externality case, where the stability of the …

: (a) equivalence of the core and the set of competitive outcomes; (b) the Shapley value is contained in the core or … approximate cores; (c) the equal treatment property holds -- that is, both market equilibrium and the core treat similar players …