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Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions

Dininio, Phyllis; Orttung, Robert W. - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 2004

Corruption is one of the key problems facing the Russian state as it seeks to evolve out of its socialist past …. Naturally, regional patterns of corruption exist across a country as large and diverse as the Russian Federation. To explain … provides the first effort to measure differences in incidence of corruption across 40 Russian regions. We find that corruption …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652685

Corruption and Bureaucratic Structure in a Developing Economy

Bennett, JOhn; Estrin, Saul - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 2006

We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005677392

The Political Economy of Corruption & the Role of Financial Institutions

Boerner, Kira; Hainz, Christa - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 2007

In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This is surprising from a … political economy perspective, as the majority of people in a corrupt country suffer from high corruption levels. Our model is …, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead to more corruption as more voters are part of the corrupt system …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005677470

Growth Slowdown Under Central Planning: A Model of Poor Incentives

Brixiová, Zuzana; Bulír, Aleš - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 2002

Centrally planned economies tend to be less efficient than economies in which agents are free to choose their output targets, as well as the means to meet them. This paper presents a simple model of planner-manager interactions and shows how planned economies can end up in a low-effort,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489931

The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying

Kerr, William R.; Lincoln, William F.; Mishra, Prachi - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 2014

How is economic policy made? In this paper we study a key determinant of the answer to the question: lobbying by firms. Estimating a binary choice model of firm behavior, we find significant evidence for the idea that barriers to entry induce persistence in lobbying. The existence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744596

Privatization Versus Competition: Changing Enterprise Behavior in Russia

Earle, John S.; Estrin, Saul - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 1997

We investigate whether competitive forces and privatization have yet began to play an efficiency-enhancing role in Russia. We also explore the economic effects of harder budget constraints on enterprise behavior. The empirical work is based on a large enterprise panel of Russian firms 1990-94,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005677389

The Efficiency and Equity of the Tax and Transfer System in France

Egert, Balazs - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 2013

Taxes and cash transfers reduce income inequality more in France than elsewhere in the OECD, because of the large size of the flows involved. But the system is complex overall. Its effectiveness could be enhanced in many ways, for example so as to achieve the same amount of redistribution at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161378

The Politics of Development Policy and Development Policy Reform in New Order Indonesia

Rock, Michael T. - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 2003

-seeking and corruption? This question is answered by demonstrating that Suharto, the leader of Indonesia’s New Order government …-growth with equity political coalition in which corruption played a central role. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489893

Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance

Licht, Amir N.; Goldschmidt, Chanan; Schwartz, Shalom H. - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 2003

hypotheses about three basic social norms of governance: the rule of law, corruption, and accountability. These norms correlate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652615

Banks-Firms Nexus under the Currency Board: Empirical Evidence from Bulgaria

Nenovsky, Nikolay; Peev, Evgeni; Yalamov, Todor - William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan - 2003

, transitional corruption and other institutional and political factors. The model is based on a survey on Bulgarian banks and a …, associated mainly with the inefficiency of the judicial system, corruption, state capture, uncertain property rights, etc. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652643