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On the Incentive Effects of Uncertainty in Monitoring Agents - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yaakov; Uske, … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

uncertainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the efforts made by competing agents (Cowen … of uncertainty (sampling occasions of productions, 1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric … or symmetric), and piece-rate reward were manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090471

Productivity in Contests: Organizational Culture and Personality Effects

Andersson, Ola; Huysentruyt, Marieke; Miettinen, Topi; … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We study the interaction of organizational culture and personal prosocial orientation in team work where teams compete against each other. In a computerized lab experiment with minimal group design, we prime subjects to two alternative organizational cultures emphasizing either self-enhancement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511325

Ambiguity aversion as a reason to choose tournaments

Kellner, Christian; Riener, Gerhard - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

tournaments and independent contracts, which are designed in a way that under uncertainty about output distribution (that is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009143373

Contests with Incumbency Advantages: An Experiment Investigation of the Effect of Limits on Spending Behavior and Outcome

Otsubo, HHironori - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

This paper experimentally investigates the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome in an electoral contest where two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, compete for office in terms of the amount of campaign expenditure. The candidates are asymmetric only in that the incumbent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548160

Less fighting than expected - experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions

Hörisch, Hannah; Kirchkamp, Oliver - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. Many other studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions. We can replicate this property. In wars of attrition, however, we find systematic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090548

Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539175

See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams

Steiger, Eva-Maria; Ro'i Zultan - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

Transparency in teams can induce cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009317896

Intrafirm Conflicts and Interfirm Price Competition

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

We study interfirm price competition in the presence of horizontal and vertical intrafirm conflicts in each firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a principal-agent framework with firms employing more than one agent and implementing a tournament incentive scheme. The principals offer premium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009319067

What renders financial advisors less treacherous? - On commissions and reciprocity -

Popva, Vera - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers) to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511336

Hidden Costs of Control: Three Repetitions and an Extension

Ploner, Matteo; Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) low and medium control treatments with 364 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool of students and demographics vary across samples. Our results largely conflict with those of the original study. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008478714