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Endogenous Community Formation and Collective Provision - A Procedurally Fair Mechanism

Güth, Werner - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631674

Bargaining and Negotiations What should experimentalists explore more thoroughly?

Güth, Werner - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

A long time ago most economists would have limited themselves to stating that agreements should be individually rational and efficient and that selecting a specific agreement from that set depends on bargaining and negotiation power whatever that may be. Nowadays hardly any economist will argue...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852417

Entrepreneurs' Acceptance of Formal Institutions: A Cross-country Analysis

Freytag, Andreas; Noseleit, Florian - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

institutions with better incentive structures for entrepreneurs are perceived as being of higher quality by this group. We find … empirical evidence that high institutional quality increases the willingness of the self-employed to accept these institutions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973304

Thinking in Chinese vs. Thinking in English: Social Preference and Risk Attitudes of Multicultural Minds

King, Li King - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

This paper investigates whether language priming activates different cultural identities and norms associated with the language communicated with respect to social preference and risk attitudes. Our contribution is on identifying the conditions where there will be language priming effects. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008519522

Fairness That Money Can Buy - Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of "self-governance". Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884452

Collective choices under ambiguity

Levati, M. Vittoria; Napel, Stefan; Soraperra, Ivan - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We investigate experimentally whether collective choice matters for individual attitudes to ambiguity. We consider a two-urn Ellsberg experiment: one urn offers a 45% chance of winning a fixed monetary prize, the other an ambiguous chance. Participants choose either individually or in groups of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010887075

Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: a theoretical and experimental analysis

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Montinari, Natalia - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009492965

House Allocation with Overlapping Agents: A Dynamic Mechanism Design Approach

Kurino, Morimitsu - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a "newcomer" in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008512518

Faulty Nash Implementation in Exchange Economies with Single-peaked Preferences

Doghmi, Ahmed; Ziad, Abderrahmane - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerant implementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of the k-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008512520

The Impossibility of Social Choice and the Possibilities of Individual Values: Political and Philosophical Liberalism Reconsidered

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

Though the social choice of social institutions or social results is impossible - there is, strictly speaking, no … social choice - individual evaluations of social institutions or results trivially are possible. Such individual evaluations … can be deemed liberal either because they emphasize political institutions that embody liberal values (political …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090466