This paper proposes a theoretical model of spatial duopoly, where the location, on the one hand, and the absorptive capacity of ï¬rms as function of their internal R+D investment, on the other hand, endogenously determine the maximum level of knowledge spillovers ï¬rms might absorb. Our goal...

We report threshold public good experiments in which group members not only need to be individually willing to contribute enough to provide the public good but also have to agree with each other on what every group members should contribute. We find strong support to the hypothesis that full...

In the two-person sequential best shot game, first player 1 contributes to a public good and then player 2 is informed about this choice before contributing. The payoff from the public good is the same for both players and depends only on the maximal contribution. Efficient voluntary cooperation...

The standard theory in tax competition as one part of the broader field of fiscal competition uses an comparative approach by drawing parallels between privat and institutional competition. The paper argues that this approach ignores certain limits of institutional competition like transaction...

The paper extends the Nash equilibrium concept to account for arbitrary behavioral heuristics. Players are allowed not only to choose strategies, but also to select behavioral rules how to choose strategies. It is argued that behavioral profiles are in equilibrium if no player can benefit from...