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Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment

Gaudeul, Alexia; Crosetto, Paolo; Riener, Gerhard - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We explore in an experiment what leads to the breakdown of partnerships. Subjects are assigned a partner and participate in a repeated public good game with stochastic outcomes. They can choose each period between staying in the public project or working on their own. There is excessive exit as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010757777

Of the stability of partnerships when individuals have outside options, or why allowing exit is inefficient

Gaudeul, Alexia; Crosetto, Paolo; Riener, Gerhard - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015

Should people be allowed to leave joint projects freely or should they be deterred from breaking off? This depends on why people stop collaborating and whether they have good reasons to do so. We explore the factors that lead to the breakdown of partnerships by studying a public good game with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011122784

Broken Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

Leibbrandt, Andrweas; Ramalingam, Abhijit; … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009492966

Leading by Words: A Voluntary Contribution Experiment With One-Way Communication

Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, M. Vittoria; Weisser, … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

mutual exchange of promises is necessary for the cooperation-enhancing effect of communication, we ï¬nd that, compared to a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008487842

Leading by example in intergroup competition: An experimental approach

Weisser, Johannes - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

follower behavior is best described as an increase in cooperation which is not conditional on the leader's decision. When … groups interact repeatedly, we do not find that leading by example is able to foster cooperation by itself. It only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391900

Leading by Words in Privileged Groups

Weisser, Johannes - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

message is the main beneficiary of cooperation. Our results show that, in the absence of communication opportunities … to the experimental game to enhance cooperation. Merely "giving someone a voice" is not sufficient. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391904

Unravelling conditional cooperation - Reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring in public goods provision

Cappelletti, Dominique; Güth, Werner; Ploner, Matteo - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

Extensive research on human cooperation in social dilemmas has shown that individuals condition their behaviour upon … cooperation. We try to assess the relative importance of three motives - namely reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring - in … games, overall we find much less conditional cooperation. In a control treatment with a less complex design, conditional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686086

Voluntary Payments, Privacy and Social Pressure on the Internet: A Natural Field Experiment

Regner, Tobias; Riener, Gerhard - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

The emergence of Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) business models as a successful alternative to conventional uniform pricing brings up new questions related to the task of pricing. We investigate the eect of a reduction of privacy on consumers' purchase decisions (whether to buy, and if so how much to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010695880

Crossing the Point of No Return: A Public Goods Experiment

Fischbacher, Urs; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

Participants in a public goods experiment receive private or common signals regarding the so-called "point of no return", meaning that if the group's total contribution falls below this point, all payoffs are reduced. An individual faces the usual conflict between private and collective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644963

Secret Santa: Anonymity, Signaling, and Conditional Cooperation

Hugh-Jones, David; Reinstein, David - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

anonymous, subjects are better at predicting second-stage behavior, and maintain a substantially higher level of cooperation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973303