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Contracts and Promises - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements

Miettinen, Topi - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract … incentives to abide by it crucially depends on whether actions are strategic complements or substitutes. With strategic … substitutes, there is a conflict between Pareto-efficiency and the incentives to abide. The opposite tends to be true when actions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090601

Tournaments and Piece Rates Revisited: A Theoretical and Experimental Study of Premium Incentives

Güth, Werner; Levínský, Rene; Pull, Kerstin; Weisel, Ori - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

introduce a new type of tournament into the literature: premium incentives. While premium incentives, just like fixed … minimization, we are able to show that premium incentives outperform fixed-prize tournaments as well as piece rates. Our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511332

Corporate Social Responsibility in the work place - Experimental evidence on CSR from a gift-exchange game

Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

We analyze the effect of investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) on workers' motivation. In our experiment, a gift exchange game variant, CSR is captured by donating a certain share of profits to a charity. We are testing for CSR effects by varying the possible share of profits...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144129

Do not Trash the Incentive! Monetary incentives and waste sorting

Bucciol, Alessandro; Montinari, Natalia; Piovesan, Marco - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

This paper examines whether monetary incentives are an effective tool for increasing domestic waste sorting. We exploit …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009363243

See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams

Steiger, Eva-Maria; Ro'i Zultan - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

Transparency in teams can induce cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009317896

Mediocrity and Induced Reciprocity

Montinari, Natalia; Nicolò, Antonio; Oexl, Regine - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We report evidence from an experiment where a principal chooses an agent out of two to perform a task for a fixed compensation. The principal's payoff depends on the agent's ex-ante ability and on a non-contractible effort that the agent has to exert once employed. We find that a significant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010570355

Task enjoyment and opportunity costs in the lab - the effect of financial incentives on performance in real effort tasks

Eckartz, Katharina M. - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

This study is directly motivated by the results of Eckartz et al (2012). Subjects exerted suprisingly high efforts irrespectively of how they were compensated. This paper discusses a number of potential explanations and then it will focus on two of them: first, subjects might exert effort simply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884457

How do Incentives affect Creativity?

Eckartz, Katharina; Kirchkamp, Oliver; Schunk, Daniel - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

a number-adding task) with the same treatments. In all tasks we find that incentives seem to have very small effects and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884482

Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence

Angelova, Vera; Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hiriart, Yolande - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm's investment is unobservable to authorities. Externality and asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539769

Hidden Costs of Control: Three Repetitions and an Extension

Ploner, Matteo; Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

under hypothetical than under real incentives. Still, in the low control treatment, we observe much weaker negative … incentives, and preliminary findings on the relationship between demographics and the degree of control aversion lead us to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008478714