Showing 1 - 10 of 15
The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836655
We study pure redistribution as a device to increase cooperation and efficiency in the provision of public goods. Experimental subjects play a two-stage game. The first stage is the standard linear public goods game. In the second stage, subjects can redistribute payoffs among other subjects in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749692
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of intergroup competition in promoting cooperative behavior. We focus on intergroup competition that is non-rival in the sense that everyone can be a winner. This type of competition does not give groups an incentive to outcompete others. However, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749767
contributions are tied to individual harm-related behavior. We conduct a large-scaled field experiment to examine voluntary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011095351
In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957704
We investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957721
The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277839
coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather … smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the acceptance of institutions depends on how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568601
We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005097659
We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005097697