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different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple … majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting pollution abatement level and social welfare. At first sight in line … with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that the change of the voting scheme implemented in an IEA does not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694111
In this empirical paper, we look at individual voting behaviour of government delegates to the International Labour … Organization (ILO). We distinguish between the instrumental motive for voting, which consists in the chance that one´s vote may … from 1977 to 1995. The hypothesis that voting is only instrumental is clearly rejected by the data. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005097496
In diesem Beitrag wird auf der Basis von Paneldaten für die westdeutschen Bundesländer untersucht, ob und in welchem Maße der demographische Wandel sowie die unterschiedlichen politischen Parteienkonstellationen die Hochschulausgaben auf Länderebene beeinflussen. Wir finden empirische...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005097917
We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957679
In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957704
We investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957721
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players' benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283657
We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369492
This study analyzes the sensitivity of US giving to both business cycle fluctuations and trend growth. With tax revenues as a point of reference, US giving constitutes a relatively stable source of revenue. Total giving is characterized by a business cycle volatility which is comparable to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694121
Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, this paper empirically analyzes the importance of equity in this field. We find that equity issues are considered highly important in international climate negotiations and that the polluter-pays...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005097611