This paper investigates the increase in wage inequality, the decline in collective bargaining, and the development of the gender wage gap in West Germany between 2001 and 2006. Based on detailed linked employer-employee data, we show that wage inequality is rising strongly – driven not only by...

Collective bargaining in Germany takes place either at the industry level or at the firm level; collective bargaining coverage is much higher than union density; and not all employees in a covered firm are necessarily covered. This institutional setup suggests to explicitly distinguish union...

We present a combined, consistent microsimulation-AGE model that uses the labour market model PACE-L, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and a discrete choice labour supply estimation. The model is used to analyse a reform that cuts the social assistance minimum income and lowers the...

This paper presents an applied general equilibrium model for Germany. The model integrates specific labour market institutions in an otherwise standard general equilibrium framework. There are sectoral wage negotiations for two skill types of workers between firms and trade unions. The...

We compare two options of integrating discrete working time choice of heterogenous households into a general equilibrium model. The first, known from the literature, produces household heterogeneity through a working time preference parameter. We contrast this with a model that directly...

We present a model that integrates the discrete working time choice of heterogenous households into a general equilibrium setting where wages are determined by sectoral bargaining between firms and trade unions. The model is calibrated to German micro and macro data. We then use it to analyse...

Gerlach and Stephan (1994) proposed a test based on the idea that the wage premium, the part of the wage which is not explained by the stock of human capital, should help predict variables such as career expectations (quit, change occupation, leave the labour force) and some job characteristics...

We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific...

We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific...

This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this purposes we conducted a simple experiment with people who have been involved in international climate policy. The experiment, which was run via the Internet, consisted of two simple non-strategic...