Showing 1 - 10 of 54
We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957679
We investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957721
literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups … coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather … smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the acceptance of institutions depends on how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568601
This paper studies the effect of information about a charity's size on individuals' donations to that charity. We conducted a framed field experiment with a non-student sample, in which subjects had the opportunity to donate for various charitable purposes. The results show that if subjects are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646447
Religion is increasingly acknowledged to be a cultural dimension which affects economic outcomes in different regards. This contribution focuses on religion's possible impact on the shadow economy. Different dimensions of the religious markets are taken into account. These dimensions refer to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009149351
In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957704
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players' benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283657
We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369492
This paper experimentally analyzes the effects if signatories to an international environmental agreement (IEA) apply different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694111
This study analyzes the sensitivity of US giving to both business cycle fluctuations and trend growth. With tax revenues as a point of reference, US giving constitutes a relatively stable source of revenue. Total giving is characterized by a business cycle volatility which is comparable to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694121