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Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation
Beyer, Mila; Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2011
as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying … their own interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects on their career …, and hence tend to over-invest into innovation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003577
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How important is industry-specific managerial experience for innovative firm performance?
Balsmeier, Benjamin; Czarnitzki, Dirk - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2014
This study examines how industry-specific managerial experience affects firms' innovation performance in the context of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957603
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Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity
Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2004
innovation, i.e. weakly controlled managers show a higher innovation propensity. However, the higher the leverage the more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005097531
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Women on the board and executive duration: Evidence for European listed firms
Buchwald, Achim; Hottenrott, Hanna - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2015
than by less effective control or a 'taste for continuity'. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011203170
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Institutionelle Investoren und Corporate Governance: Eine empirische Analyse
Steiger, Max - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 1998
Eine der herausragenden Entwicklungen auf den internationalen Finanzmarkten in den letzten Jahren ist die Institutionalisierung, d. h. die zunehmende Delegation privater Ersparnisse an professionelle Kapitalanleger - den institutionellen Investoren. Darunter sind private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008614872
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Ownership concentration, institutional development and firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe
Balsmeier, Benjamin; Czarnitzki, Dirk - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2010
concentration distribution that is dominated by a 'private benefits of control' problem with rising ownership concentration. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794610
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Bank owners or bank managers: who is keen on risk? Evidence from the financial crisis
Gropp, Reint; Köhler, Matthias - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2010
manager-controlled banks. The results are robust to controlling for a wide variety of bank specific, country specific …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008518270
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Blockholdings and corporate governance in the EU banking sector
Köhler, Matthias - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2009
governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate … indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533672
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Corporate governance and current regulation in the German banking sector: an overview and assessment
Köhler, Matthias - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2010
This paper gives an overview over corporate governance and banking regulation in Germany. Particular attention is put on legal and regulatory changes that were made in response to the financial market crisis. The paper shows that the changes mainly focus on the remuneration of managers and on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494187
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Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe: empirical evidence of managerial disciplining in Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK
Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle; Köke, Jens; Renneboog, Luc - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2001
This study examines managerial disciplining in poorly performing firms using large panels for Belgian, French, German and UK firms. We consider the monitoring role of large blockholders, the market for share blocks, creditors, and non-executive directors. Board restructuring is correlated to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005097669