We test the performance of various measures of global liquidity as early warning indicators of booms in house and equity prices in 20 OECD countries between 1970 and 2010. We use a panel probit approach to test the relative performance of global liquidity measures based on two aggregation...

This paper models monetary policy decisions as being taken by an interacting group of heterogeneous policy makers, organized in a committee. Disclosing the premises on which an individual view on the interest rate is based is likely to provide value added in terms of the quality of the...

We study the effects of Central Bank transparency on inflation and the output gap. We thus identify a small analytical model which concludes that transparency affects the variability of inflation and output and not their average levels. Then we examine whether this conjecture holds empirically,...

We provide a framework for analysing the choice between optimal and robust rules in the presence of paradigm uncertainty in monetary policy. We thus provide two issues: first, we discuss the conditions of uncertainty that render a robust rule a preferable substitute to optimal rules and second,...

We analyse the optimal composition of a federal or supra-national committee. The representation of regional (national) entities in federal committees is typically motivated by their superior knowledge of local conditions. Using this argument, we formally model the optimal composition of a...

The independent nature of the Central Bank is often associated with achieving low and stable inflation. Further to that the merits of independence are stretched to achieving low(er) output variability when compared to a government run monetary policy. In this paper we use the Alesina and Alesina...

The literature on the behavior of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has focused on static voting patterns. We find statistical support for a dynamic pattern using a panel reaction function to analyze MPC votes over the 1997-2008 period. We find that internal and external...