This paper focuses on the interaction between regulation and competition in an industrial organisation model. We analyse how capital requirements a.ect the pro.tability of two banks that compete as Cournot duopolists on a market for loans. Bank management of both banks choose optimal levels of...

We empirically test whether there is a causal link between the real interest rate and the natural rate of interest, which could be a harbinger of secular stagnation if the real rate declines. Outcomes of VAR models for Japan, Germany and the US show that a fall in the real rate indeed affects...

Central banks have become increasingly transparent during the last decade. One of the main benefits of transparency predicted by theoreticalmodels is that it enhances the credibility, reputation, and flexibility of monetary policy, which suggests that increased transparency should result in...

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quality of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, is increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour....

We investigate the implications for he setting of interest rates when monetary policy decisions are taken by a committee, in which a subset of members may meet prior to the voting in the commitee and therefore has the possibility to reach consensus ex ante to vote unanimously ex post. We allow...

This paper analyzes the trade-off between financial stability and credit rationing that arises when increasing capital requirements. It extends the Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit rationing to allow for bank default. Bank capital structure then matters for lending incentives. With default and...

In this paper various Value-at-Risk techniques are applied tot the Dutch stock market index AEX and to the Dow Jones Industrial Average. the main conclusions are: (1) Changing volatility over time is the most important characteristic of stock returns when modelling value-at-risk; (2) For high...