This paper shows that a rate hike has countervailing effects on banks' risk appetite. It reduces risk when the debt burden of the banking sector is modest. We model a regulator whose trade-off between bank risk and credit supply is derived from a welfare function. We show that the regulator...

Simultaneous bank defaults are often attributed to interbank contagion, but can also be due to common shocks affecting banks with similar balance sheets. We disentangle both effects by realising that if financial markets expect a bank's default to be contagious, an increase in this bank's...

We show that through facilitating maturity transformation, the lender of last resort gives banks an incentive to lever, diversify, and lower their lending standards. Bank leverage increases shareholder value because maturity transformation effectively allows banks to borrow against lower...

This paper analyzes the conditions under which a financial institution is systemically important. Measuring the level of systemic importance of financial institutions, we find that size is a leading determinant confirming the usual "Too Big To Fail" argument. Nevertheless, the relation is...

This paper studies why the micro-prudential regulations fails to maintain a stable financial system by investigating the impact of micro-prudential regulation on the systemic risk in a cross-sectional dimension. We construct a static model for risk-taking behavior of financial institutions and...

When does the general public lose trust in banks? We provide empirical evidence using responses by Dutch survey participants to eight hypothetical scenarios. We find that members of the general public care strongly about executive compensation. Negative media reports, falling stock prices, and...

We introduce a structural dynamic network model of the formation of lending relationships in the unsecured interbank market. Banks are subject to random liquidity shocks and can form links with potential trading partners to bilaterally Nash bargain about loan conditions. To reduce credit risk...

If monetary policy is to aim also at financial stability, how would it change? To analyze this question, this paper develops a general-form, axiomatic framework. Financial stability objectives are shown to make a monetary authority more aggressive. By that we mean that in reaction to negative...

This paper models a financial sector in which there is a feedback between individual bank risk and aggregate funding market problems. Greater individual risk taking worsens adverse selection problems on the market. But adverse selection premia on that market push up bank risk taking, leading to...

We analyse three databases of banking crises and investigate their consistency in the identification and timing of crises. We find that there are large and statistically significant discrepancies between the three datasets. We also compare the dating of banking crises according to these...