A large population plays a two-period sequential common agency game. Agents are long lived, while principals are short lived. Preferences and technology are additively separable in time and time independent. At the onset, agents are matched in pairs under private information of individual types....

The paper studies, in a repeated interaction setting, how the presence of cooperative agents in a heterogeneous community organized in groups, affects group efficiency and stability. The paper extends the literature by assuming that each type can profitably mimic other types. It is shown that...

We study optimal procurement in the presence of default risk. Contractors differ in the penalty they suffer in case of default, which is private information. If the loss to the procurer from non-completion is high relative to the cost of completion, the optimal mechanism is to assign the project...

I simulate a life-cycle model with preferences described by a utility function a' la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). I show that temptation to consume contributes to explain the saving, retirement consumption, and asset allocation puzzles. I perform two analyses, with and without Social Security...

We develop a model of optimal asset allocation based on a utility framework. This applies to a more general context than the classical mean-variance paradigm since it can also account for the presence of constraints in the portfolio composition. Using this approach, we study the distribution of...