We examine agricultural contracting parties' incentives to employ quality measurement. Quality measurement will be used if on-farm production of ``quality'' is sufficiently cheap, and quality measurement sufficiently informative. We qualitatively test these predictions with empirical observation...

This paper estimates an agency model of contracts used in California's processing-tomato industry. Model estimation proceeds in three stages. We first estimate growers' stochastic production possibilities, and then, for a given vector of preference parameters, compute an optimal compensation...

Due to differences in ownership structure between cooperative and non-cooperative firms (NCFs), it has been hypothesized that co-ops may be less efficient than their non-cooperative counterparts. Illiquidity of owners’ investment and democratic governance may lead to underinvestment and...

We investigate the economic importance of implicit quality incentives in an agricultural market that lacks the institutional capacity for measuring quality verifiably. We measure the magnitude of implicit price premiums for quality, and we distinguish empirically between hedonic-pricing and...