We study the emergence and nature of long-run behavior of continuous state space dynamics that are subjected to random shocks. It is shown that the fine details of the underlying deterministic dynamics may be crucial in determining the evolution of the system. In particular, a risk dominated...

We propose a novel approach to modelling time preferences, based on a cognitive shortcoming of human decision makers: the perception of future events becomes increasingly `blurred' as the events are pushed further in time. Our model explains behavioural `anomalies' such as preference reversal...

A popular theory of business cycles is that they are driven by animal spirits: shifts in expectations brought on by sunspots. A prominent example is Howitt and McAfee (AER, 1992). We show that this model has a unique equilibrium if there are payoff shocks of any size. This equilibrium still has...

It is shown that player mobility has important consequences for the long-run equilibrium distribution in dynamic evolutionary models of strategy adjustment, when updating is prone to small probability perturbations, i.e. ``mistakes'' or ``mutations.'' Ellison (1993) concluded that the effect on...

Consider a situation in which a principal commits to a mechanism first and then agents choose unobservable actions before their payoff-relevant types are realized. The agents' actions may affect not only their payoffs directly but also the distribution of their types as well. This paper extends...

Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run under the best-response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size, the evolutionary process can select...

We analyze a family of extensive-form solution procedures for games with incomplete information that do not require the specification of an epistemic type space a la Harsanyi, but can accommodate a (commonly known) collection of explicit restrictions D on first-order beliefs. For any fixed D we...

We study the optimal auction problem with participation costs in the symmetric independent private values setting, where bidders know their valuations when they make independent participation decisions. After characterizing the optimal auction in terms of participation cutoffs, we provide an...

The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet...

This paper concerns the interpretation of equilibrium in non-additive beliefs in two-player normal form games. We argue that such equilibria involve beliefs and actions which are consistent with a lack of common knowledge of the game. Our argument rests on representation results which show that...