Traditional fisheries management schemes generate incentives for vessels to maximize catch, resulting in rent dissipation and overcapacity. Individual vessel quota management schemes change the incentives to maximize profit and have the potential to generate resource rent and reduce capacity. An...

In industries where firms can adjust product mix in response to price changes, the process can be delayed by adjustment costs. An example is fishermen who change fishing grounds to target different species. If adjustment costs are sufficiently large, this may hamper the fishermen’s response so...

An analysis of consumer preferences for seafood labeled with information about environmental production attributes is introduced into the food labeling literature. International seafood ecolabeling programs have proposed to create market-based incentives for fisheries managers to promote...

When individual vessel quotas are used in fisheries management, quotas are set species by species, in most cases. Often, it is only the most important of the target species that are regulated by quota. There is a growing concern that the introduction of individual vessel quotas leads to...

This study deals with modeling of production risk by means of a two-step procedure. In contrast to earlier studies of production risk, we do not immediately adopt restrictive functional forms for the risky production technology. We first test for the presence of production risk. If production...