Showing 1 - 10 of 309
This paper examines the relationship between organization contextual variables and humanresource management (HRM) practices in small firms. The proposed model is based on anintegration of theoretical perspectives, including the resource-based approach, institutionaltheory, transaction cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316877
This paper studies management when the principal has different degrees of commitment power. In a model in which both the principal and agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities, implicit incentives arise when the principal is not able to commit herself to long-term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792112
Why do firms delegate job design decisions to workers, and what are the implications of such delegation? We develop a private-information based theory of delegation, where delegation enables high-ability workers to signal their ability by choosing difficult tasks. Such signalling provides a more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123930
We manipulate workers' perceived meaning of a job in a field experiment. Half of the workers are informed that their job is important, the other half are told that their job is of no relevance. Results show that workers exert more effort when meaning is high, corroborating previous findings on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337021
The performance of a work team commonly depends on the effort exerted by the team members as well as on the division of tasks among them. However, when leaders assign tasks to team members, performance is usually not the only consideration. Favouritism, employees' seniority, employees'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011722656
This paper investigates the optimal design of incentives when agents distort probabilities. We show that the type of probability distortion displayed by the agent and its degree determine whether an incentivecompatible contract can be implemented, the strength of the incentives included in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460007
Comparative payment schemes and tournament-style promotion mechanisms are ubiquitous in the work place. We test experimentally whether they have a negative impact on the willingness to cooperate. Participants first perform in a simple task and then participate in a public goods game. The payment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225779
Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376645
In this paper we investigate the impact of upper and middle level managers on firm performance by simultaneously estimating manager and match qualities for management pairings in Major League Baseball (MLB). We document the economic significance of managers at both organizational levels and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011339152
Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to be dysfunctional (gaming). This paper applies the empirical test developed by Courty and Marschke (2008) to detect whether the widely used class of Residual Income based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350010