We explain a counterintuitive empirical finding: Firms facing more import competition do more innovation. In our model, factors are trapped inside a firm. An increase in import competition encourages a firm to innovate by reducing the opportunity cost of inputs. Without trapped factors, trade...

In this paper, we study a particular uneven-aged forest stand management pattern that is often advocated in practice. The forest structure under consideration is similar to a normalized forest à la Faustmann, with the following difference: rather than being single aged, each forest tract...

This paper addresses the question of whether R&D should be carried out by an independent research unit to be produced in-house by the firm marketing the innovation.

This paper addresses the question of whether R&D should be carried out by an independent research unit or be produced in-house by the firm marketing the innovation. We define two organizational structures. In an integrated structure, the firm that markets the innovation also carries out and...

. In this paper, we study physician specialty decisions using several unique data sets which include information on almost all Canadian physicians who practised in Canada between 1989 and 1998. Unlike previous studies, we use a truly exogenous measure of potential income across general and...

This paper addresses the issue of estimating semiparametric time series models specified by their conditional mean and conditional variance. We stress the importance of using joint restrictions on the mean and variance. This leads us to take into account the covariance between the mean and the...

This paper examines the frequency, pervasiveness, and determinants of product switching by US manufacturing firms. We find that one-half of firms alter their mix of five-digit SIC products every five years, that product switching is correlated with both firm- and firm-product attributes, and...

We examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information. In our model, a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in both period prices. We show (perhaps...

We analyze firms’ entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces...

In this paper, I offer two ways in which firms can collude: secret monitoring and infrequent coordination. Such collusion is enforceable with intuitive communication protocols. I make my case in the context of a repeated Cournotoligopoly with flexible production, prices that follow a Brownian...