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Congestion and the Optimum City Size.

Sheshinski, Eytan - In: American Economic Review 63 (1973) 2, pp. 61-66

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005237837

Budget Displacement Effects of Inflationary Finance.

Green, Jerry; Sheshinski, Eytan - In: American Economic Review 67 (1977) 4, pp. 671-82

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005241505

The Factor Price Frontier with Embodied Technical Progress.

Levhari, David; Sheshinski, Eytan - In: American Economic Review 60 (1970) 5, pp. 807-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005759159

Demand Fluctuations, Capacity Utilization, and Costs.

Sheshinski, Eytan; Dreze, Jacques H - In: American Economic Review 66 (1976) 5, pp. 731-42

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005759292

Welfare Aspects of a Regulatory Constraint: Note.

Sheshinski, Eytan - In: American Economic Review 61 (1971) 1, pp. 175-78

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761531

Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics

Stiglitz, Joseph E. - In: American Economic Review 92 (2002) 3, pp. 460-501

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005821519

Toward a General Theory of Wage and Price Rigidities and Economic Fluctuations

Stiglitz, Joseph E. - In: American Economic Review 89 (1999) 2, pp. 75-80

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005821995

Risk and Global Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial Integration May Be Undesirable

Stiglitz, Joseph E. - In: American Economic Review 100 (2010) 2, pp. 388-92

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584547

Equilibrium Fictions: A Cognitive Approach to Societal Rigidity

Hoff, Karla; Stiglitz, Joseph E. - In: American Economic Review 100 (2010) 2, pp. 141-46

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Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?

Murdock, Kevin C.; Hellmann, Thomas F.; Stiglitz, Joseph E. - In: American Economic Review 90 (2000) 1, pp. 147-165

In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005563690