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An agent advises a principal on selecting one of multiple projects or an outside option. The agent is privately informed about the projects' benefits and shares the principal's preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option. We show that for moderate outside option...
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We study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have "character" and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. Character is desirable, and a voter's utility is a convex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233572
This paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when managers are privately informed and communicate strategically. We consider a multidivisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other. Information about local...
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Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In this comment,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008645025
Randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation. We generalize the theory of randomized assignment to accommodate multi-unit allocations and various real-world constraints, such as group-specific quotas ("controlled choice") in school choice and house allocation, and scheduling and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815743
Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008835268
Much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction. This static assumption is not only unrealistic, but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations. The current paper introduces possible long-term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005757466
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