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The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking...
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A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572967
Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the...
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This paper uses data on all house transactions in Massachusetts over the last 20 years to show that houses sold after foreclosure, or close in time to the death or bankruptcy of a seller, are sold at lower prices than other houses. Foreclosure discounts are on average at 27 percent of the value...
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In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011129973
A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we...
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