We study a contest with multiple, nonidentical prizes. Participants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) affecting their costs of effort. The contestant with the highest effort wins the first prize, the contestant with the second-highest effort wins the second prize, and so on...

We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting ineffi ciencies create a motive for post-auction trade which, in our model, takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to...

Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses quality information in wholesale automobile auctions. We argue that buyers in this...

Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In this comment,...

Several impatient investors with private costs <em>C_i</em> face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value <em>V</em> is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor <em>i</em> to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, <em>V-C_i</em>. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash...

The Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design which has been adopted for many spectrum auctions worldwide. Since its inception, the CCA has been in almost continual evolution. We begin by reviewing some important changes which have already occurred....

Our recent research (Budish, Cramton, and Shim 2013) proposes frequent batch auctions—uniform-price sealed-bid double auctions conducted at frequent but discrete time intervals—as a market design alternative to continuous-time trading in financial markets. This short paper discusses the...

The paper reports the architecture of a continuous combinatorial auction. Preferences are based on sets of items and feasibility requires the nonintersection of sets. Countdown clocks replace eligibility and activity requirements typical of rounds-based auctions. Bids remain in the system to be...

Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual...