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The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Reply.

Bowles, Samuel - In: American Economic Review 76 (1986) 5, pp. 1203-04

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233726

The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models.

Bowles, Samuel - In: American Economic Review 75 (1985) 1, pp. 16-36

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005237748

Economists as Servants of Power.

Bowles, Samuel - In: American Economic Review 64 (1974) 2, pp. 129-32

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005237897

The Problem with Human Capital Theory-A Marxian Critique.

Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert - In: American Economic Review 65 (1975) 2, pp. 74-82

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005237922

Contested Exchange: Political Economy and Modern Economic Theory.

Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert - In: American Economic Review 78 (1988) 2, pp. 145-50

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005757064

The Invisible Fist: Have Capitalism and Democracy Reached a Parting of the Ways?

Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert - In: American Economic Review 68 (1978) 2, pp. 358-63

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005758616

Long Swings and the Nonreproductive Cycle.

Gordon, David M; Weisskopf, Thomas E; Bowles, Samuel - In: American Economic Review 73 (1983) 2, pp. 152-57

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005758822

Understanding Unequal Economic Opportunity.

Bowles, Samuel - In: American Economic Review 63 (1973) 2, pp. 346-56

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005759237

Labor Discipline and Aggregate Demand: A Macroeconomic Model.

Bowles, Samuel; Boyer, Robert - In: American Economic Review 78 (1988) 2, pp. 395-400

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005821321

The Persistence of Inferior Cultural-Institutional Conventions

Belloc, Marianna; Bowles, Samuel - In: American Economic Review 103 (2013) 3, pp. 93-98

Our theory of cultural-institutional persistence and innovation is based on uncoordinated updating of individual social norms and contracts, so that both culture and institutions co-evolve. We explain why Pareto-dominated cultural-institutional configurations may persist over long periods and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010659381