We consider a consumption and investment problem where an investor¡¯s investment opportunity gets enlarged when she becomes rich enough, i.e., when her wealth touches a critical level. We derive optimal consumption and investment rules assuming that the investor has a time-separable von...

The paper provides a framework for analysis of remuneration to agents whose task is to make well-informed decisions on behalf of a principal, with managers in large corporations as the most prominent example. The principal and agent initially bargain over the pay scheme to the latter. The...

We analyze investment decisions when information is costly, with and without delegation to an agent. We use a rational-inattention model and compare it with a canonical signal-extraction model. We identify three "investment conditions". In "sour" conditions, no information is acquired and no...

We propose a new holding horizon measure of active management and examine its relation with fund performance. Our measure identifies long-horizon funds as having higher future long-term alphas and owning stocks with superior long-term fundamentals. Such funds supply skills, but these skills only...