Live cattle are increasingly priced as an explicit function of U.S. Department of Agriculture yield and quality grades. Human graders visually inspect each slaughtered carcass and call grades in a matter of seconds as the carcass passes on a moving trolley. We examine whether there is systematic...

We study incentives for information sharing among agricultural intermediaries in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output. Information sharing always increases expected grower and total surplus, but may reduce expected intermediary profits. Even when expected profits increase with...

We study incentives for information sharing among agricultural intermediaries in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output. Information sharing always increases expected grower and total surplus, but may reduce expected intermediary profits. Even when expected profits increase with...

Traditional moneylenders monitor farmers to ensure that their investment is not diverted. Modern farming contracts offered by supermarkets in developing countries often entail a loan component, and monitoring arises as well. However, unlike moneylenders, supermarkets do care about the attributes...

Relative performance schemes such as tournaments are commonly used in markets for a variety of livestock and processing commodities, while explicit versions of these schemes are rarely used in markets for fresh fruits and vegetables and specialty grains. We show how contracts for these latter...

This article examines motivations underlying the government's choice of alternative policy mechanisms for subsidizing agriculture. Optimal policies are analyzed for three government objectives: one where the government wishes to ensure a minimum level of net income for all farmers, a second...