"Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents" (with Claude Crampes), Les Annales d'Economie et Statistique, 49-50, pp 265-288, 1998. Reprinted in The Economics and Econometrics of Innovation, ed. Encaoua, Hall, Laisney, Mairesse, Kluwer academic publishers, 2000.

A patent is not a perfect protection against imitation. It only grants the patentholder the right to sue intruders once they have been identified. In order to identify an infringer, a patentholder must first monitor the market, and then react in case of infringement. His reaction may be to go to...

Licensing a new technology implies introducing competition into the market. This has a negative effect on the profit of the incumbent if the demand remains unchanged. However, because of the novel content of an innovation, consumers may have different perceptions of the value of a good depending...

Patent protection restricts entry rather than preventing it. In case of a process innovation, it forces a potential entrant to sufficiently differentiate his production technology. We investigate whether a patentholder threatened by entry can strategically renew her patent. For low demand, the...

Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce he information gap, consumers can rely on standards (e.g., certification) that ensure quality and origin of the goods. These costly standards can be adopted by a group of producers of...