We study duopolistic markets where a profit-maximizing firm competes with an employee-controlled firm that maximizes value-added per employee. We first study an industry with Cournot competition. We show that the presence of an employee-controlled firm does not affect the equilibrium number of...

The share of the public sector in health insurance provision varies enormously from country to country. It is larger in more redistributive countries. We provide a possible theoretical explanation for these facts: a public health insurance system, financed by taxes, can be an efficient means of...

The literature provides two polar explanations for the variety of products of quantities offered on the market. Either this variety results from the number of firms, each of which supplies a single product or quality. Or else there is a monopoly offering a variety of products, that is, choosing...

Two justifications can be found for the use of a system of bonuses and penalties in automobile insurance. The first refers to risk selection, the second to the inducement to greater prudence at the wheel. Based on a model which incorporates both factors, it appears that the system of bonuses and...

By a selection of examples that we present in detail, we illustrate the recent advances in the strategic approach to bargaining theory. We examine in turn: -- static models with incomplete information; -- dynamic models with complete information; -- dynamic models with incomplete information.