This paper analyses strategic fiscal policy-making within the context of the standard two-country-two-good real trade model developped by Turnovsky (1988). Introducing asymmetry between the two countries and assuming that one country acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to the other one, we...

This paper investigates the sustainability of fiscal co-ordination between two regions according to three criteria of co-ordination: tax harmonization, fiscal cooperation and bargaining. We show that in a two-region model in which regions differ in size, bargaining is the only sustainable...

The paper develops a signalling theory of conspicuous consumption where the drive toward spending on an otherwise unuseful good comes from the desire to enter clubs and benefit from the provision of club good financed by members of a club and from a social status effect. Individual incomes are...

We investigate the endogenous choice of leadership in commodity tax competition. We apply an endogenous timing game, where jurisdictions commit themselves to lead or to follow, to the Kanbur and Keen (1993) model. The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) correspond to the two Stackelberg...

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