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Baake, Pio; Sudaric, Slobodan - 2016

We analyze pricing and competition under paid prioritization within a model of interconnected internet service providers (ISPs), heterogeneous content providers (CPs) and heterogeneous consumers. We show that prioritization is welfare superior to a regime without prioritization (network...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574872

Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK (with an Application to the Orange/T-Mobile Merger)

Harbord, David; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony market which includes many mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; networkbased price discrimination; and call externalities. The analysis focuses on the short-run effects of adopting lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468563

New networks, competition and regulation

Baake, Pio (contributor); Kameckey, Ulrich (contributor) - 2006

structure with one firm choosing higher investments. While access regulation imposed on the dominant firm leads to lower prices … network effects leading to potentially increased demand, regulation can substantially lower aggregate social welfare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003304433

Mobile phone termination charges with asymmetric regulation

Baake, Pio (contributor); Mitusch, Kay (contributor) - 2005

We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003005098

Local power markets

Baake, Pio; Schwenen, Sebastian; Hirschhausen, … - 2020

In current power markets, the bulk of electricity is sold wholesale and transported to consumers via long-distance transmission lines. Recently, decentralized local power markets have evolved, often as isolated networks based on solar generation. We analyze strategic pricing, investment, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301346

Calling Circles: Network Competition with Non-Uniform Calling Patterns

Hoernig, Steffen; Inderst, Roman; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with non-uniform calling patterns, which account for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small subset of people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784708

Competition Between Multiple Asymmetric Networks: Theory and Applications

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We present a tractable model of competition between an arbitrary number of interconnected communications networks in the presence of tariff-mediated network externalities, call externalities, and cost and market share asymmetries. On the theory side, we provide a criterion for stability in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679877

Tariff-Mediated Network Externalities: Is Regulatory Intervention Any Good?

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Mobile phone networks' practice of charging higher prices for off-net than for on-net calls has been pinpointed as the source of two competition problems: underprovision of calls and permanent disadvantages for small networks. We consider these allegations and four different remedies: limiting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114399

The Breakdown of Connectivity Breakdowns

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

finite call and receiving prices exist for a large and realistic range of call externality values. This allows regulation of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084152

Asymmetric Broadband Wholesale Regulation

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

existing access regulation is based on a single essential network. We show that continued asymmetric access regulation of one … network does not control sufficiently for market power and benefits the unregulated network, and that symmetric regulation … would lead to higher consumer surplus. Furthermore, the whole setup of access regulation may not be viable in the long run …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024485