We derive a simple equation for the welfare gains from trade when tariffs are liberalized or iceberg trade costs fall. Covering various one-sector trade models that may or may not feature extensive margins and imperfect competition, we generalize the analysis of Arkolakis, Costinot and...

This paper looks inside the firm and investigates how trade alters the matching of worker-specific abilities and task-specific requirements. The outcome of this matching depends on how firms organize their recruitment process and how much they invest into the screening of applicants. In the open...

This paper is a dynamic extension of the well-known theory of trade in tasks. In my model, a firm's offshoring decision is governed by production cost savings, but also considers potential imitation risk. I show that such a consideration reduces the level of offshoring compared to a static...

We set up a two-country general equilibrium model, in which heterogeneous firms from one country (the source country) can offshore routine tasks to a low-wage host country. The most productive firms self-select into offshoring, and the impact on welfare in the source country can be positive or...

We allow a contest organizer to bias a contest in a discriminatory way; i.e., she can favor specific contestants by designing the contest rule in order to maximize total equilibrium effort (resp. revenue). The two predominant contest regimes are considered, all-pay auctions and lottery contests....

Quantifying the welfare effects of trade liberalization is a core issue in international trade. Existing frameworks assume perfect labor markets and therefore ignore the effects of aggregate employment changes for welfare. We develop a quantitative trade framework which explicitly models labor...

We analyze the offshorability of jobs using the German Qualifications and Career Survey. The paper differentiates between outsourcing potential and international tradability and systematically uses a large set of potential determinants of organizational and spatial relocation derived from the...

Decisions of national competition authorities have important effects on other jurisdictions. We provide a framework to quantify the domestic and cross-border effects of mergers, and to draw conclusions for the coordination of national merger policies. We develop a two-country model with many...

This paper studies externalities of nationally determined cost-sharing systems, in particular coinsurance rates (patients pay a percentage of the price), under pharmaceutical parallel trade, i.e. trade outside the manufacturer's authorized distribution channel, in a two-country model with a...

This paper introduces the theory of firm organization under moral hazard into an equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous talents and technologies. The model is able to explain how the allocation of power and the provision of financial incentives inside firms varies within and...