We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more...

We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap‐talk refinement, neologism‐proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is...

We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender-one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...

We characterize the equilibrium of a complete markets economy with multiple agents featuring a preference for the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. Utilities are defined over an aggregate of two goods. We provide conditions under which the solution of the planner's problem exists, and it...

We propose a novel approach to deal with the problem of indeterminacy in linear rational expectations models. The method consists of augmenting the original state space with a set of auxiliary exogenous equations to provide the adequate number of explosive roots in presence of indeterminacy. The...

We introduce the extended perturbation method, which improves the accuracy of standard perturbation by reducing approximation errors under certainty equivalence. For the New Keynesian model with Calvo pricing, extended perturbation is more accurate than standard perturbation, which implies...

Single‐agent dynamic discrete choice models are typically estimated using heavily parametrized econometric frameworks, making them susceptible to model misspecification. This paper investigates how misspecification affects the results of inference in these models. Specifically, we consider a...

Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. In many games, equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations. In this paper, we describe state-of-the-art techniques for...

How do families behave dynamically? We provide a framework for studying economic problems in which family behavior is essential. Our key innovation is the inclusion of imperfectly altruistic agents in an otherwise standard consumption-savings problem with exogenous income risk. This gives rise...

We investigate the estimation of models of dynamic discrete-choice games of incomplete information, formulating the maximum-likelihood estimation exercise as a constrained optimization problem that can be solved using state-of-the-art constrained optimization solvers. Under the assumption that...