The revision is also innovative, because it modifies the methodology to place greater emphasis on evidence of adverse competitive effects. Most of this “evidence†is completely consistent with past practice and uncontroversial. One type of...

If the 2010 Merger Guidelines do not appear to offer much that is new, it is reasonable to ask what purpose they serve. Do we need Merger Guidelines any more? Gregory Leonard (NERA)

It also indicates greater Agency scrutiny of such transactions in industries characterized by differentiated products and high levels of R&D spendingâ€â€such as the high tech and pharmaceutical industries. Janet McDavid & Eric Stock (Hogan Lovells)

The big development of the new Guidelines is that, read as a whole, they embrace three trends with the potential to make merger work significantly longer and less predictable. Hill Wellford & Gregory Wells (Bingham McCutchen)

By reducing clarity and consistency in favor of granting broader discretion to decision makers, the Guidelines waive an opportunity to serve as a template for bringing greater order to global process. William Blumenthal (Clifford Chance)

We are given a lot of tools, but no warning label on how or when to employ them. Michael Doane (Competition Economics, LLC), Luke Froeb & Steven Tschantz (Vanderbilt University)

In evaluating the impact of the HMGs, it is useful to keep in mind the distinction between transparency and predictability. James Langenfeld (Navigant Economics)

The 2010 Guidelines move away from asking the “right questions†by generally removing from the Guidelines the notion that anything is necessary to establish the market power effects of a merger. Paul Denis (Dechert)

Net neutrality is but one piece of the puzzle to ensuring an open internet. Christopher Meyers (Microsoft)

While potential ACO members would like the antitrust authorities to provide guidance (and, in particular, safe harbors) for forming ACOs, it is not obvious how to craft such guidance. Gregory Pelnar (Compass Lexecon)