Motivated by agency theory, we explore how powerful CEOs view leverage. Because of the agency conflict, CEOs may adopt sub-optimal leverage levels that promote their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Using Bebchuk <italic>et al.</italic> (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to gauge CEO power, we find...

We explore the role of powerful CEOs on the extent of risk-taking, using Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS). Based on more than 12,000 observations over 20 years (1992-2012), our results reveal a nonmonotonic association. In particular, relatively less powerful CEOs exhibit...

We examine the impact of corporate governance quality on the extent of analyst coverage. The evidence based on nearly 3000 firms indicates that more analysts are likely to cover firms with weaker corporate governance. In particular, as corporate governance quality falls by one SD, analyst...

We explore the effect of religious piety on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Prior research links religion to honesty and risk aversion. Accordingly, religion induces managers to be more honest and likely view as opportunistic and unethical an exploitation of other stakeholders. Risk...

Because of concentrated ownership stakes, board composition and longer-investment horizons, founding-family controlled firms provide an interesting setting for examining issues relating to governance and control. Anderson and Reeb (2003a, b, 2004), find that the founding-family controlled...

We investigate the impact of regulation on shareholder rights and corporate governance. We gauge the strength of shareholder rights by measuring the number of restrictive governance provisions that suppress shareholder rights - the more restrictive the governance, the weaker the shareholder...

As part of corporate social responsibility, companies invest in activities that promote human rights or refrain from activities that violate human rights. Investments in human rights, however, usually do not yield immediate benefits. Rather, they are expected to improve the reputation of the...

The quiet life hypothesis posits that entrenched managers are well insulated from removal and thus prefer to enjoy a quiet life, i.e. they tend to be less ambitious, avoid difficult decisions and engage in less risk-taking (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). We utilize the staggered board (or...

‘Lucky’ CEOs are given stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing, severe agency problems and poor corporate governance. We find that lucky (opportunistic) CEOs invest significantly less in CSR. The evidence thus...