We study how short-term informational advantages can be monetized in a high-frequency setting, when large inventories are explicitly penalized. We find that if most of the additional information is revealed regardless of the high-frequency traders' actions, then fast inventory management allows...

I study short-sale constraints in a market with asymmetric information. I offer a novel approach endogenizing short-sale constraints by including an asset-borrowing market in my model. Short-sellers have to borrow an asset and therefore reveal information to a lender. The lender trades on her...

I model a market in which a trader with superior information about an asset is subject to careful scrutiny by another agent who immediately observes the trading decisions of the informed agent with some noise and engages in (klepto)parasitic behavior by imicking the informed trader and trading...

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of...

We develop a two-period general equilibrium model of portfolio delegation with competitive, differentially skilled managers and convex compensation contracts. We show that convex incentives lead to significant equilibrium mispricing, but reduce price volatility. In particular, price...

How does private information get incorporated into option prices? To study this question, I develop a non-linear, noisy rational expectations equilibrium model with asymmetric information and a full menu of call and put options available for trading. The model allows for an arbitrary...

I develop a noisy rational expectations equilibrium model with a continuum of states and a full set of options that render the market complete. I show a major difference in equilibrium behaviour between models with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and non-CARA preferences. First, when...

Using the introduction of high-speed rail (HSR) as an exogenous shock to costs of information acquisition, we show that reductions in information-acquisition costs lead to (i) a significant increase in information production, evidenced by a higher frequency of analysts visiting portfolio firms,...

Market design matters when heterogeneous borrowers roll over loans, facing funding shocks. Borrower anonymity is a key feature of various financial markets, such as short term, interbank lending markets. We show that anonymous markets experience systemic runs for large shocks, but provide...

Large investors often advertise private information at private talks or in the media. To analyse the incentives for information disclosure, I develop a two-period Kyle (1985) type model in which an informed short-horizon investor strategically discloses private information to enhance price...