A cooperative game with transferable utility describes a situation inwhich players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A sharefunction for such games is a function which assigns for every game adistribution of the payoffs over the players in the game.In this paper we consider cooperative...

In this paper we describe the extreme points of two closely related polytopes that are assigned to a digraph. The first polytope is the set of all sharing vectors (elements from the unit simplex) such that each node gets at least as much as each of its successors. The second one is the set of...

A situation in which a finite set of players can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility. A solution for TU-games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of the payoffs that can be earned over the individual players. Two well-known...

The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this...

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions (possibly empty or consisting of a unique element) to every...

One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...

In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model...

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. A difference between the restricted Banzhaf value and the Myerson value (i.e. the Shapley...