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Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This … article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the … applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185
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Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002048152
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Analyzing the effects of insuring health risks : on the trade-off between short run insurance benefits vs. long run incentive costs
Cole, Harold L.; Kim, Soojin; Krueger, Dirk - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009680697
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Analyzing the Effects of Insuring Health Risks : On the Trade-Off between Short Run Insurance Benefits vs. Long Run Incentive Costs
Cole, Harold L. - 2012
This paper constructs a dynamic model of health insurance to evaluate the short- and long run effects of policies that prevent firms from conditioning wages on health conditions of their workers, and that prevent health insurance companies from charging individuals with adverse health conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097204
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Entrepreneurial moral hazard in income insurance
Ejrnæs, Mette; Hochgürtel, Stefan - 2011
We study entrepreneurs’ behavioral responses of effort (moral hazard) to avoid business failure.This is done in the context of an unemployment insurance scheme for self-employed, wherewe estimate how much of the transition probability to unemployment can be causally attributedto being insured....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376618
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Better safe than sorry? : ex ante and ex post moral hazard in dynamic insurance data
Abbring, Jaap H.; Chiappori, Pierre-André; Zavadil, Tibor - 2008
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376656
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A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care
Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; Klaauw, Bas van der - 2008
We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377059
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An analysis of the effects of the severance payment reform on credit to Italian SMEs
Calcagno, Riccardo; Kräussl, Roman; Monticone, Chiara - 2008
We study the effects of the reform of the system of severance payments (TFR) of Italian employees on the cost and the access to credit for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). The most direct consequence of the reform is to reduce in the long run the amount of liquid assets available to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377271
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Disciplining and screening top executives
Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2006
Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349199
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Insurance and information : firms as a commitment device
Bovenberg, Ary Lans; Teulings, Coen N. - 2001
We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to thedelivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently riskaverse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316894